



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

BOOK REVIEWS.

ESSAYS ON TRUTH AND REALITY. By F. H. Bradley, LL.D.
Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. xvi, 480.

Mr. Bradley's "Appearance and Reality" is generally recognized as the most important contribution to constructive metaphysics that has been made in recent times,—perhaps the most important since Hegel. The present collection of Essays,—the greater part of which had previously been published in *Mind*,—may be regarded as a supplement to that work. It is partly an attempt to make the general point of view clearer, partly an application of it to the treatment of some detailed problems, and partly (perhaps mainly) a criticism of some rival theories,—especially those of William James and Mr. Bertrand Russell. Mr. Bradley's criticisms of pragmatism have a special interest, owing to the fact that there are some leading doctrines of pragmatism that he appears to accept. The pragmatists seem hardly to have realized how much he is in agreement with them. He agrees with them in thinking that there is no such thing as absolute Truth. He holds also that Reality has to be interpreted as the Good, or as that which gives complete satisfaction,—a view which is at least closely akin to pragmatism. Most of the other contentions of the pragmatists, however, so far as any definite meaning can be attached to them, are rejected by Mr. Bradley. His criticisms are probably the most searching to which the views of the pragmatists have ever been subjected; but, like most of their critics, he is keenly conscious of the difficulty of ascertaining what their views really are. This difficulty is found also, to some extent, in dealing with the theories of Mr. Russell,—not because they are not clearly explained, so far as they go, but because they are still in the making. Mr. Russell, of course, rejects the two points on which Mr. Bradley is in partial agreement with the pragmatists. The result is that for him truth means the apprehension of 'hard facts,' having absolute and independent reality. Mr. Bradley urges the impossibility, on this theory, of recognizing any real unities, such as Mr. Russell appears, nevertheless, to acknowledge. He rejects pluralism, though he recognizes a plurality of 'finite centers.'

Mr. Bradley admits that his own doctrine involves certain ultimate difficulties and even unintelligibilities. But this does not imply any real inconsistency, since he believes that there is no such thing as absolute truth. He can still maintain that reality must be thought of as *a completely coherent whole felt as such*, and that what we apprehend is more real in proportion to its more perfect approximation to this standard, though we can never know reality in any absolute sense.

The ethical bearings of his doctrine are not much considered by Mr. Bradley in this volume. Most of the points on which he touches,—such as the significance of the ideas of God and immortality,—have been more fully dealt with in Dr. Bosanquet's recent Gifford Lectures. At the same time, Mr. Bradley's statements have always a freshness and individuality that give them a quite peculiar charm and interest of their own. The following is perhaps the most striking passage bearing upon the conduct of life (pp. 468-9) :

"Our real world of fact may, for anything we know, be one of the least pieces of reality, and there may be an indefinite number of other real worlds superior to our own. On the other hand, our world is the one place in which we are able to live and work. . . . *Cultiver notre jardin* is the beginning, and it is in a sense the end, of wisdom. . . . Our world and every other possible world are from one side worthless equally. As regions of mere fact and event, the bringing into being and the maintenance of temporal existence, they all alike have no value. . . . Our life has value only because and so far as it realizes in fact that which transcends time and existence. Goodness, beauty, and truth are all there is which in the end is real. Their reality, appearing amid chance and change, is beyond these and is eternal. But, in whatever world they appear, that world so far is real. And yet these eternal values owe their existence to finite wills, and it is therefore only each in our own world that we can come to possess them. We must till our garden awake, and in no dream, to gain the fruits and flowers for which alone it is worth while to live, and which, if anywhere there are better, at least to us are everything. If this is not Heaven, it at least comes nearer to the reality of the Blessed Vision than any stupid Utopia or flaring New Jerusalem adored by the visionary. . . . 'For love and beauty and delight,' it is no matter where they have shown themselves, 'there is no death

nor change'; and this conclusion is true. These things do not die, since the Paradise in which they bloom is immortal. That Paradise is no special region nor any given particular spot in time and space. It is here, it is everywhere where any finite being is lifted into that higher life which alone is waking reality."

This passage is certainly eloquent and probably wise, even if the view of reality which it suggests is not easy to make quite coherent. It should be remembered, however, that the gardens that we cultivate are not private preserves. We have to try to plant some perennials in them. And is it so certain that Utopias are always 'stupid'? May not the gardener think of brighter flowers that he might cultivate? Even if Mr. Bradley's doctrine of reality is as true as he believes, the effort after progress would seem to have a considerable 'degree of reality.' But perhaps he does not mean to deny this; and, at any rate, in such a review as this it is not possible to do more than hint at criticisms that might be made. It may be added that the book has an excellent index.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

University College, Cardiff.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRACTICAL. Translated from the Italian of Benedetto Croce by Douglas Ainslie, B.A., M.R.A.S. London: Macmillan & Co., 1913. Pp. xxiv, 591.

This interesting work is, in temper and point of view, fundamentally Hegelian. According to its author, Reality is Spirit: this proposition being taken to express the very essence of philosophy. Philosophical discussion must concern itself with one question, that of the *forms* of the spirit's activity. These, according to Croce, are two only, cognition or the theoretical activity, and will or the practical activity. Each has two sub-forms: those of the theoretic activity are æsthetic, which produces images, and logic, which produces concepts; while those of the practical activity are economic and ethic. Croce, having dealt with the theoretic activity in two earlier works, endeavors in "The Philosophy of the Practical" to complete his exposition of reality.

The book is divided into three parts. The first deals with